In a notable decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution must present to the trial court all relevant materials to evaluate the mitigating circumstances favoring the accused when the offenses are so grave that the death penalty is appropriate. The Court made it clear that this procedure must be carried out even in situations where the accused might not receive the death penalty in the end.
In Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 510 from last year, the Court emphasized the importance of evaluating mitigating circumstances at the trial stage. In the current decision (Vikas Chaudhary v. The State of Delhi), the Court has gone one step further and stated that such an exercise must be carried out even in situations in which the death penalty should be imposed but cannot. When considering fixed-term sentences, this will assist higher courts in evaluating the convict’s available mitigating circumstances.
: KM Joseph and S Ravindra Bhat of the Supreme Court issued the following ruling:
“it is held that any place the arraignment is of the assessment that the wrongdoing a charged is sentenced for, is grave to the point that capital punishment is justified, it ought to do the activity of setting the materials, concerning Manoj, for assessment”.
In other words, if the death penalty were proposed, the prosecution would need to inform the court and present the relevant materials (as outlined in Manoj).
case this outcomes in burden of capital punishment, at the phase of affirmation, the High Court would have the advantage of free assessment of these materials. In contrast, the High Court may still be able to evaluate whether the sentence is adequate and, if necessary and justifiable, impose a special or fixed-term sentence during an appeal brought by the state or the complainant/informant. When an appeal is filed by the state or the complainant for an enhancement of sentence (whether resulting in the imposition of capital punishment, or a term sentence), the High Court must request such material “given the imperative need for such material to form a part of the court’s consideration. It must be emphasized that in the event that the trial court has failed to carry out such exercise (for whatever reason), the High Court must call for such material.”
In Manoj, the court said that the state must tell the Sessions Court about the psychiatric and psychological evaluation of the accused for a crime that carries the death penalty. The background of the accused’s family, education, and socioeconomic status should also be gathered by the prosecution. For more, read here.
The Supreme Court also reiterated that the trial court does not have the authority to sentence the accused to life in prison for the rest of their life or life in prison without the right to remission for a fixed term for serious crimes that carry the death penalty, unless life in prison is the sentencing option.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Union of India v. Sriharan @ Murugan & Ors., [] was noted by the court. 2015] 14 SCR 613, has supported an exceptional class of sentence for serious violations where capital punishment is subbed with life detainment for a decent number of years-which might be longer than the base sentence determined in Segment 433A of the Code of Criminal Strategy, 1973 (CrPC) and may stretch out to extensively extensive stretches, like 30 years. However, the court stated that Sriharan (2015) reserved the authority to impose such special or fixed-term sentences only with the Supreme Court and High Courts.
Justices K.M. Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat were hearing an appeal from the trial court’s conviction and sentencing order, which gave the accused a fixed term sentence of 30 years without parole for the abduction and murder of the deceased. In an appeal, the High Court upheld the same.
The bench made the observation that the top court had been in a similar situation three times before, when the trial court had sentenced the accused to life in prison or a fixed term of at least 20 years without the right to remission. The court stated that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sriharan (2015), the case was clearly beyond the trial court’s authority.
Vikas Chaudhary and Vikas Sidhu, the accused, were found guilty of the crime under Sections 302, 364A, 201, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and they were given life sentences for the rest of their lives. In addition, the accused were told that they would not be eligible for parole, remission, or a furlough until they served 30 years in prison. In the allure recorded by the blamed, the Delhi High Court had certified their conviction for the offense as well as the sentence forced by the preliminary court.
The accused pleaded that it was outside the jurisdiction of the trial court to provide a specific term of punishment or life imprisonment for the rest of one’s life as an alternative to the death penalty, challenging the conviction and sentence before the Supreme Court.
They further contended that the alleviating conditions in support of themselves, and the report of the post trial supervisor were neither viewed as by the preliminary court, nor the High Court while maintaining the sentence.
The court reasoned that in Swamy Shraddananda v. State of Karnataka, [2008] 11 SCR 93, the Supreme Court had created a unique category of sentences for serious crimes in which the death penalty is replaced by life in prison for a predetermined number of years. The Pinnacle Court in Association of India versus Sriharan @ Murugan and Ors, [2015] 14 SCR 613 had supported something very similar.
“It is thus clear that Sriharan (supra), approved an alternative third sentencing option in cases where the accused are convicted of serious and grave crimes carrying with it the option of capital sentence,” the court stated in reference to its decision in Sriharan (2015). This court decided to retain to itself (and the High Courts) the option of imposing what Sriharan referred to as “special” or “fixed term sentences” because it was aware of the asymmetry in state rules regarding minimum incarceration in various types of life sentences and the fact that a life sentence by itself can lead to early release of the accused upon their undergoing the minimum sentence prescribed under Section 433A.
The court concluded: As a result, it is abundantly clear that the trial courts are prohibited from using the death penalty in place of a modified or specific term sentence, such as life in prison for the rest of the convict’s life. The court, while attempting an offense deserving of capital punishment or life detainment, has just these two choices.”
According to the test outlined in Bachan Singh v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 684, the bench noted that whenever the state proposes and urges for the imposition of the death penalty, it must provide material to facilitate the court’s exercise of balancing the aggravating factors with the mitigating circumstances.
“The commitment to do this adjusting interest is upon the courts forcing the sentence in the primary case, i.e., the preliminary courts; According to Bachan Singh, the court stated, “The prosecution is also under an obligation to demonstrate that the mitigating circumstances are absent27, particularly that there are no opportunities for the accused to reform.”
It added that the said practice is commanded at the phase of conviction at whatever point a grievous capital wrongdoing is perpetrated, since the court has no clue about that the indictment might ask for capital sentence. ” The court stated, “When that stage occurs and the prosecution seeks a capital sentence, the court must exercise the exercise of conducting a review of aggravating circumstances (which are already on the record and are factors that lead to the accused’s conviction) and balancing the mitigating circumstances (which are not matters of the record and must be adduced by the accused and the prosecution).”
Examining current realities of the case, and the relieving and irritating elements included, the court saw that a solid case was made out on the side of the blamed’s likelihood for change and reintegration into the general public. As a result, the bench partially granted the appeal and reduced the accused’s sentence to a minimum of 20 years in actual prison.
Shivangi, 2bba.llb, Christ university
