Case details:
CASE TITLE: Pappu vs State of U.P. & Ors.
CASE DETAILS: Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 7975 of 2023
CORAM: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Advocates for Petitioner: Vishnu Murti Tripathi
Advocates for Respondent: G.A.,Juned Alam,Pradeep Kumar
The Allahabad High Court has requested that the supreme Arya Samaj Body review current practices and offer directives to end child weddings.
The ruling was issued by Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery’s single-judge bench in response to individuals deceiving the Arya Samaj by making false or untrue claims that the bride and groom are both majors and obtaining a marriage certificate after solemnizing the same in their ceremonies.
The appellant was found guilty of the aforementioned offenses by the Trial Court, and he was sentenced to death under Section 302 IPC.10.1. The High Court of Judicature in Allahabad maintained this judgment. The court determined that the witnesses PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, and PW-7 were reliable and truthful, and that the prestige and reputation of the family was a legitimate reason for the delay in filing a FIR. The court maintained the appellant’s death sentence and dismissed the defense’s claim that it was given in error because of prior animosity. In this case, the appellant Pappu, who belonged to the same caste, socioeconomic class, and place of origin as the victim, is accused of abducting, brutally raping, and killing Am, a 7-year-old girl. The knowledgeable attorney for the appellant has claimed that there is a chance the FIR was filed earlier than it should have been, which is supported by the fact that PW-3 and PW-2 attended the scene of the deceased body’s discovery at 10:00 a.m.
The prosecution has not been able to show that the deceased’s body was found at the appellant’s request or that he knew where the body was located. They further claimed that the trial court had incorrectly considered the purportedly incriminating utterances the appellant made while being held by the police. The knowledgeable defense attorney for the appellant has contended that the medical and forensic evidence in this instance is neither sufficient to establish the appellant guilty of the crime nor sufficient to link the appellant to it. He has also contended that the lower courts erred by relying on Section 29 POCSO, failing to make unfavorable conclusions in accordance with Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, and failing to take the standards of caution and prudence into account while evaluating the testimony of PW-1 through PW-4.
The knowledgeable attorney for the appellant has stated that the death sentence shouldn’t be upheld until there is a chance for reformation. He has cited the ruling in Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, which said that it is necessary to take into account a convict’s chances of reform and rehabilitation in society before imposing the death penalty. The appellant’s dependency on his or her family and socioeconomic background also point to a possibility of reformation.
“Recently, the Court has seen certificates being issued for marriages solemnized by the ritual of the Arya Samaj by deceiving them on the basis of a forged or incorrect declaration that both the bride and the groom are major. However, invariably, it was found to be contrary to record and thus enabled the members of the Arya Samaj to not only commit an illegal act but also to act against the teachings of their guru. The court ruled that doing so would amount to nothing less than breaking the faith Swami Dayanand enforced on Samaj members.
The Trial Court and High Court both considered the crime’s heinous nature as the sole determining element for the imposition of the death penalty in the current case. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him the following day. The High Court made remarks about the threat of rape and the brutal killing of children, but confirmed the death sentence with no significant mitigating circumstances and plenty of aggravating circumstances. The impugned orders confirming and awarding the death sentence are based on assumptions that the death sentence must be given due to the crime and its odious nature. The Trial Court and High Court should have given due consideration to mitigating factors before coming to the conclusion that the option of any other punishment was foreclosed.
This case raises the question of whether the death penalty is necessary or if another sentence should be substituted. The savage rape and murder of a seven-year-old girl is a particularly horrific crime, but the appellant has a clean record in prison, a low socioeconomic background, and a family with a wife, children, and elderly father. It is unlikely that the appellant will be reformed and given a second chance unless he has a history of criminal activity or is an experienced offender. However, the 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Shatrughna Baban Meshram (supra) has not found favor by the U.S. The Supreme Court ruled that the appellant’s conviction for crimes under Sections 376, 302, 201, and 5/6 POCSO was affirmed and the punishments imposed on him were upheld with the exception of the death sentence for the crime under Section 302 IPC.
The appellant’s death sentence for the crime under Section 302 IPC was commuted into a life sentence in prison, with the condition that the appellant will not be eligible for early release or remission before serving an actual sentence of 30 years in prison. The appellant’s other sentence provisions, such as the fine amount and default requirements, were also upheld.
NAME: Sarah Garima Tigga, SEMESTER: VI, COLLEGE: Symbiosis Law School (Pune)
