Gian Singh vs State of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012

Introduction

To avoid the time-consuming and costly procedure of judicial proceedings, parties seek to resolve their differences outside of court. Cases might be either civil or criminal in nature. However, instances involving major difficulties cannot be avoided, and mutual settlement is not permitted. The settlement is determined by the nature of the offence, whether it is compoundable or not. Compoundable offences are included in Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but non-compoundable offences are not. Such offences cannot be resolved amicably since monetary compensation does not alleviate the victim’s mental and physical pain. However, courts have discretion when it comes to non-compoundable offences.

In the Indian legal system, a compromise agreement is a settlement entered into between the accused and the victim in a criminal case. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the compromise agreement can be entered into at any stage of the criminal proceedings, and if the court is satisfied that the compromise is genuine and based on the facts of the case, it can acquit the accused.

However, the validity of the compromise agreement was a matter of debate among legal scholars and the judiciary. Some argued that the compromise agreement in criminal cases was against public policy and the interests of justice, while others believed that it was a mechanism for speedy resolution of non-serious criminal cases.

Facts:

• Gian Singh, a resident of Punjab, was accused of assaulting and injuring a man in 1994. The case was registered under Sections 324 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
• During the trial, the accused and the victim reached a compromise, and the victim filed an affidavit before the court stating that he had no objection to the acquittal of Gian Singh. The trial court accepted the compromise and acquitted Gian Singh.
• The State of Punjab challenged the acquittal in the High Court, arguing that the compromise was illegal and against public policy. The High Court set aside the acquittal and ordered a retrial of the case. Gian Singh then appealed to the Supreme Court.
• The learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner under Sections 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. He filed an appeal against his conviction with the Sessions Judge. While his appeal was ongoing, he appealed to the learned Sessions Judge for compounding the offence, which was instructed to be heard alongside the main appeal, according to the learned counsel.
• Following that, the petitioner filed a motion for quashing the FIR under Section 482[1], Cr.P.C. on the grounds of compounding the offence. By the challenged judgement, the High Court rejected the plea under Section 482 Cr.P.C. As a result, this petition has been filed with this Court.

Contention of the parties:

“The petitioner has been convicted under Section 420 and Section 120B, IPC by the learned Magistrate. He filed an appeal challenging his conviction before the learned Sessions Judge. While his appeal was pending, he filed an application before the learned Sessions Judge for compounding the offence, which, according to the learned counsel, was directed to be taken up along with the main appeal. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing of the FIR on the ground of compounding the offence. That petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been dismissed by the High Court by its impugned order.”[2]

Issue:

1. Whether or not non-compoundable offences can be permitted to be compounded by the Court, directly or indirectly?

Statutes involved:

• Section 420, Indian Penal Code[3]
• Section 120B in The Indian Penal Code[4]
• Section 320, The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973[5]
• Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973[6]

Bench:

• Justice R.M. Lodha,
• Justice Anil R. Dave,
• Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya

Judgment

The Supreme Court ruled that the high court must refrain from quashing criminal proceedings where the act is heinous and serious, or when the public interest is at stake. The proceedings may be annulled if the offence is only a civil issue, offences deriving from commercial activities, when the harm is personal in character, and the parties have resolved their disagreement. If the likelihood of conviction is remote and the continuation of the criminal case would result in grave injustice to the accused, the criminal proceedings may be halted by the high court.

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”[7]

The ability of the High Court to cancel any criminal procedure, FIR, or complaint in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and distinct from the power granted to a criminal court under Section 320 of the Code to compound the offences. Inherent authority has no statutory limitations, but it must be employed in accordance with the guidelines engrafted in such power, namely (I) in order to uphold the end of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of any Court’s procedure. In what instances, when the perpetrator and victim have settled their disagreement, the authority to quash the criminal process, complaint, or F.I.R may be used depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and no category may be defined. However, before using such authority, the High Court must consider the nature and seriousness of the offence. Even if the victim or victim’s family and the perpetrator have settled the disagreement, heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, such as murder, rape, and dacoity, cannot be properly quashed.

In light of a chain of decisions and the legislation on the subject, the Supreme Court established the following principles for quashing criminal proceedings in cases of non-compoundable offences by high courts when invoking their inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC:

• Predominantly civil character of offence – The jurisdiction granted to high courts under Section 482 of the CrPC to dismiss criminal proceedings for non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the CrPC can be invoked if the offence is just a mainly civil and commercial concern.
• Offences that are heinous and severe – High courts shall refrain from quashing criminal proceedings if the offence is heinous and serious and has a serious impact on society.
• Offences under Section 307 IPC – Even though the offence falls under the categories of heinous and serious offences and is against society, the high courts may not base their judgement only on the fact that the offence involved is under Section 307 of the IPC. The high court may consider whether the inclusion of Section 307 of the IPC is for show or if there is sufficient evidence to substantiate it. The nature of the damage, whether it is on a crucial bodily part, the kind of the weapon used, and other factors may be considered by the high court. This would be admissible only after the evidence has been gathered and the charge-sheet has been filed/charge has been prepared, and/or during the trial. It is not permitted while the case is being investigated.
• Special statutes– If the offence falls under a special legislation, such as the Prevention of Corruption Act, or is committed by public workers while serving in that capacity, the high court shall refrain from quashing the criminal process based on a compromise between the victim and the offender.
• Antecedents/conduct of the accused-  When the offences involved are private, the high court is required to consider the antecedents and conduct of the accused while exercising its power under Section 482 of the CrPC in respect of non-compoundable offences on the ground that there is a compromise/settlement between the victim and accused.

Significance of the Case:

 The Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab case is a landmark case in Indian criminal law as it recognized the validity of compromise agreements in criminal cases. The Supreme Court’s guidelines provide a framework for courts to determine the validity of such compromises, balancing the interests of justice and the parties involved. The case has had far-reaching implications for the Indian criminal justice system, providing a mechanism for speedy resolution of non-serious criminal cases through compromise agreements.

However, the court’s guidelines have been subject to criticism from some legal scholars who argue that the guidelines are vague and open to interpretation. They believe that the compromise agreements in criminal cases should be restricted only to minor offences, and the court should take into account the victim’s interest before accepting the compromise.

Conclusion

The High Court must consider whether continuing with the criminal proceeding would be unfair or contrary to the interests of justice, or whether continuing with the criminal proceeding would amount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer, and whether, to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case be put to rest, and if the answer to the above question(s) is affirmative, the High Court shall be weary.                                                                                                  

[1] S. 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

[2] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/69949024/#: Gian Singh vs State Of Punjab & Anr on 24 September, 2012 (Paragraph 1)

[3] S. 420, The Indian Penal Code, 1960.

[4] S. 120B, The Indian Penal Code, 1960.

[5] S. 302, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

[6] S. 482, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

[7] This extract is taken from Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 769 at page 342

This article is written by Tanaya Devadhe of 4^th Semester of ILS Law College, Pune