| Citation- | AIR 2006 SC 3385 |
| Date of judgment | 11 October, 2006 |
| Case no | Civil writ petition no. 284-285 of 2005 |
| Case type | writ petition |
| Petition/appellant | Epuru Sudhakar & Anr. |
| Defendant/respondent | Govt. of A.P. & Ors. |
| Bench | Arijit Prasayat |
| Court | Supreme court of India |
Statue reffered :
- Article 72of the constitution of India.
- Article 161of the constitution of India.
Cases referred:
- Maru Ram vs Union of India and Ors, 1981 (1) SCC 107
- Constitution of India, 1950, Article 72
- Constitution of India, 1950, Article 161
- Kehar Singh vs Union of India, 1989 AIR 653, 1988 SCR Supl. (3) 1102
- Tata Cellular vs Union of India, 1996 AIR 11, 1994 SCC (6) 651
Introduction-
The term ‘pardon’ has been defined as an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the law, which exempt the individual on whom it is bestowed upon, from the punishment the law inflict he has committed.
The authority to pardon in the constitution under article 72 says the president the authority to award pardon, reprieves, respites, or remission of penalty, as well as to suspend, remit, or commute the sentence of any individual convicted of any offence.
The council of ministers would oversee and prevent the improper use of authority, just as Article 72 grants the President the power. Similarly, Article 161 provides the Governor of a state with the authority to act against any individual convicted of an offense related to matters falling under the executive’s jurisdiction.
Facts of the case-
- Petitioner No. 1 is the son of the late Sh. Epuru Chinna Ramasubbaiah, who, along with another individual, was murdered on 19.10.1995. Petitioner No. 2 claims to be the son of the late Sh. Tirupati Reddy, who was allegedly murdered by respondent No. 2 while he was on bail in his father’s murder case.
- Respondent No. 2, Ambi Reddy, faced trial, and eventually, the matter reached this Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 519-521 of 2003, which this Court resolved through a judgment dated 19.11.2003. The conviction of respondent No. 2 was modified from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), to Section 304(1) read with Section 109 IPC. He was sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment, while the conviction related to some other charges was upheld.
- On 28.5.2003, respondent No. 3, the wife of respondent No. 2, submitted a representation for granting parole to him. On 18.10.2003, parole was granted for 15 days, but it was revoked on 30.10.2003 by the State Government due to concerns expressed by the Superintendent of Police, Kurnool, regarding a potential breach of peace and disruption of law and order if respondent No. 2 visited Nandikotkur Assembly Constituency.
- Respondent No. 3 contested the Andhra Pradesh Assembly Election and was elected as a member of the Legislative Assembly on 12.5.2004. On 14.5.2004, she made a representation for granting parole to respondent No. 2, which was approved on 19.5.2004 and extended subsequently. On 18.7.2004, a fourth extension for 15 days was granted. On 10.10.2004, respondent No. 3 requested respondent No. 1 for a pardon for respondent No. 2 under Article 161 of the Constitution, alleging that he had been falsely implicated in cases due to political rivalry.
- While the pardon petition was pending on 18.10.2004, respondent No. 2 was granted one month of parole. On 11.8.2005, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh purportedly exercised the power under Article 161 of the Constitution, granting remission of the remaining sentence of respondent No. 2. The Director General and Inspector General of Police (Correction Services) of Andhra Pradesh were directed to take action for his release, and indeed, on 12.8.2005, the Superintendent of Central Prison, Cherlapally, R.R. District, ordered the release of respondent No. 2.
Issue:
- The legal question pertains to judicial review concerning the exercise of the pardon power and its potential for abuse.
- To what extent can the authority of the governor or president, particularly concerning the power to grant pardons, be considered absolute?
Arguments:
The Petitioner contended that
- The unlawful form of immunity was received by the congressional activist, who was convicted by the Governor of Andhra Pradesh, due to the absence of relevant materials presented to the Governor, and the contentious order was issued without proper consideration, as contended by the petitioner’s counsel
The Respondent maintained the following objections that
- It is argued by the counsel representing the respondents, including respondent 2 and 3, that political retaliation was the source of this petition. They assert that the Governor, as the higher authority, thoroughly examined all pertinent materials and exercised authority to grant referrals. The petitioner appears to be confusing between pardon and sentence reductions in this case materials to be forwarded, and this hospital should not intervene. In the view of limited scope of judicial review, the order application should be Rejected.
- Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that though in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Others [1981 (1) SCC 107] this Court had indicated certain recommendatory guidelines, the same did not find acceptance in Kehar Singh and Another v. Union of India and Another [1989(1) SCC 204]. As a matter of fact in a later decision in Ashok Kumar @ Golu v. Union of India and Ors. (1991 (3) SCC.
Judgement:
- The existence of administrative indulgence was first explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which raised the point was established to prevent injustice towards the convicted person. It was admitted that the criminal had recognized their mistakes and that society would not gain anything from their subsequent incarceration and their future behavior as upstanding and law-abiding citizens.
- judicial enforcement by the court is not always wise or affirmative enough to adequately alleviate guilt. To provide remedies, governments and monarchies believe that powers beyond the courts must be granted, specifically, the power to improve or avoid certain criminal convictions. As a result, it can be seen in all of the given examples that the court can perform judicial review of the presidential pardon to rectify unfair or arbitrary judgments. However, the breadth of this authority is restricted. The judiciary’s powers come into play only after the order has been authorized in cases of a) inadvertent application; b) failure to follow the Council of Ministers’ recommendations; c) dishonesty; d) exclusion of relevant materials; and e) arbitrary materials.
- Judge Passayat acknowledged Sir William Wade’s viewpoint, a well-known academic lawyer, and confirmed that the wide range of words in Article 72 cannot establish the exact conditions for using this authority due to unique facts and instances.
- It is well established that the President or Governor’s exercise or non-exercise of pardon power is subject to judicial review. Limited judicial review is available in certain cases.
- In Maru Ram’s case (supra), it was established that all public powers, including constitutional powers, must not be exercised arbitrarily or in bad faith. Ordinarily, guidelines for fair and equal execution ensure the valid exercise of power.
- It is important to note that in Kehar Singh’s case (supra), the argument that the power of pardon can be exercised for political reasons was unequivocally rejected. In Maru Ram’s case (supra), it was determined that considerations of religion, caste, color, or political loyalty are entirely irrelevant and discriminatory.
- In Kehar Singh’s case (supra), it was decided that the President’s order cannot be subjected to judicial review on its merits except within the strict limits outlined in Maru Ram’s case (supra). The function of determining whether the act of a constitutional or statutory functionary falls within the constitutional or legislative grant of power, or is tainted by a mistaken understanding of the full extent of the power, is a matter for the court.
- In Kehar Singh’s case (supra), relying on the doctrine of the separation of powers, it was argued that it was not within the judiciary’s purview to scrutinize the exercise of the “mercy” power. Addressing this argument, this Court held that the question of the President’s power under Article 72 falls squarely within the judicial domain and can be examined by the court through judicial review.
- However, the notion that authority should be utilized responsibly should be in harmony with the doctrine that the court should not encroach upon the president’s discretion in granting pardons. True discretion can only be exercised by the president within the framework of legal logic. Ultra vires action may be taken if these limits are violated. The court will only step in and provide judicial review in specific situations.
- Upon reviewing the legal principles in the context of the facts, it becomes evident that unnecessary and extraneous elements entered the decision-making process, thereby vitiating it.
- The remission order challenged in the petition is clearly untenable and is set aside. Nevertheless, respondent No.1 may consider the petition as pending for the purpose of re-consideration. The Governor has the authority to take notice of materials presented to him by State authorities, as well as to conduct such inquiries as he deems necessary and relevant to establish the pertinent factors.
Conclusion:
- The question of whether Article 72 becomes redundant due to judicial review of presidential pardons is negated. A body of previous Supreme Court cases indicates that Presidential Pardons are subject to judicial review, albeit limited. This review is only applicable when executive clemency exceeds the bounds of legal reasonableness, maintaining the delicate balance between administrative and judicial powers that remains evident today.
- While the courts have occasionally ventured beyond the fine line delineated in Maru Ram’s case, such instances are considered exceptions. They should be dismissed as the Court has strayed only slightly from the path set out in the Maru Ram decision.
- Therefore, in the words of Chief Justice Pathak, “in any civilized society, few attributes are more important than the life and personal liberty of its members,” and the pardoning authority of the President and Governor is one function that ensures these rights. This authority is thus a fundamental and vital component of the Constitution, and it is imperative that its custodians exercise it in a fair and impartial manner, with the judiciary continuing to serve as a watchdog in such situations.
Drafted by: Jhalak Varshney, Lloyd Law college, Greater Noida, an intern under legal vidhiya.
