| CITATION | 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1356 |
| DATE OF JUDGEMENT | 18th OCTOBER, 2023 |
| COURT | SUPREME COURT OF INDIA |
| APPELLANT | DEBASHISH PAUL AND ORS. |
| RESPONDENT | AMAL BORAL |
| BENCH | SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J |
INTRODUCTION
Debashish Paul v. Amal Boral is a case that revolves around the nuances and different parts of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act of 1997[1] and the Limitation Act of 1963[2]. The respondents received a notice of eviction and filed the lawsuit on the basis of nonpayment of rent. The appellants filed a lawsuit in trial court, and the judge dismissed it due to late filing, citing relevant sections of the Limitation Act of 1963. The verdict was overturned on the grounds of section 5 of the Act after the respondents preferred a civil revision at the Calcutta High Court (hereinafter referred to as HC). A subsequent appeal to the Hon’ble Supreme Court (hereinafter referred to as SC) overruled the HC’s decision to favour the contentions of the appellants and mandated the payment of the required damages and rent. By the ruling in this case, future legal processes pertaining to the Limitation Act in the Indian legal system would be influenced, which clarifies the interpretation and implementation of pertinent legal laws and concepts.
FACTS OF THE CASE
According to the statement, the appellants are the shop’s landlords and the respondent was taken on as a tenant for a monthly fee of Rs. 352/-. According to the appellants, the respondent allegedly ceased paying the rent in February 2005. As a result, on October 31, 2013, the respondent was given notice to leave the property. Soon later, the respondent-tenant was sued by the appellants for eviction due to unpaid rent. The respondent filed an application in the proceedings based on the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, Sections 7(1) and (2). The Trial Court denied the application on the grounds that the respondent had appeared in the lawsuit on February 9, 2016, but had not submitted the application until December 14, 2016, a ten-month delay as it was not within a span of 1 month. Aggrieved by this, the respondent filed a Civil Revision at the HC. This resulted in the judgement being set aside and giving the respondent-tenant the ability to file an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, outlining the reasons behind the delay and requesting a pardon for the delay in support of the application. The respondent-tenant used his inability to pay monthly rent arrears as a justification for his failure to deposit the money claiming that his advocate misled him into believing that no action was necessary given the HC’s stay. The HC ordered the Trial Court to decide the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act within the specified time frame, ideally within two months of the application date, without granting any needless extensions. As a result, the notice was issued in the SLP and leave was granted.
ISSUES OF THE CASES
- Whether the reasons for delay of filing the application at the Trial Court sustainable?
- Whether the Respondent is liable to pay the rents?
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent contended that-
- Even though the respondent/tenant appeared in the lower court on February 9, 2016, he acknowledged that he did not submit any applications under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act within a month of receiving the summons or, in the event that no summons was served, within a month of the date of entering appearance. It is therefore, a settled legal proposition, that the tenant must adhere to the process outlined in the statute. Strict adherence to the statute was required.
- The court must determine whether or not the tenant’s failure to follow the statutory procedure was the result of wilful misconduct on their part when determining the statutory obligation to be fulfilled by the tenant/respondent in order to have protection under rent legislation. Consequently, in the event that a tenant defaults or refuses to pay rent, as demonstrated by their actions and behaviours, to the extent that they reveal a disposition of disobedience or gross negligence, the tenant will surely no longer be entitled to protection.
- After receiving inaccurate guidance by his highly learned counsel, who instructed the petitioner not to take any action for depositing the rent due to the landlord in anticipation of a stay order being obtained by the HC, the tenant/respondent admittedly failed to submit arrears of rent in addition to monthly payment. When the tenant/respondent learned that the case had been scheduled for an ex-parte hearing, he took all necessary steps to support his intentions. On December 14, 2016, he filed a written statement and an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, in an attempt to refute the eviction suit. In order to designate a new learned counsel on February 9, 2016, the petitioner had to receive no objections from his former conducting learned lawyer.
- It is a well-established legal principle that the court considering an application under Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the Act has the authority to extend the period for depositing rent arrears if the tenant provides proper justification.
- Given the facts, the tenant should not be forced to bear the consequences of the advocate’s default, particularly in situations like this one. If necessary, this discretion may be used in favour of the tenant.
CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
The Appellant contended-
- There is no disagreement on the respondent’s failure to pay the rent. The application was submitted outside of the statutory time and was made in accordance with Sections 7(1) and 7(2) of the aforementioned Act. The sole justification offered was that the advocate’s counsel and the Trial Court processes were inadequate, and that’s why he filed the written declaration in an attempt to atone. Thus, the focus of the arguments was on whether the respondent may have benefited by the HC’s use of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order for the Trial Court to hear the claim.
- The respondent argues that Section 40 of the Tenancy Act makes the Limitation Act’s provisions applicable to the appeals process, and as a result, the respondent is free to use such provisions. In response, the experienced counsel of the appellant argued that although the aforementioned clause is the general requirement, the Limitation Act of 1963 prevents a smaller time from being extended if it is set aside for any reason.
- In Bijay Kumar Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamariya[3], the appellant argued that the case is completely covered by a two-judge bench of this court and that, in this case, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply.
JUDGEMENT
The SC opined that in the statement that, even though Section 40 of the aforementioned Act generally applies the Limitation Act to its provisions, the Limitation Act’s provisions cannot be expanded upon if the said Act specifies a shorter time period for limitation. Therefore, the logic in the Bijay Kumar Singh case is unquestionable, especially considering that in addition to filing an application, the tenant must also deposit the acknowledged rent arrears, which has undoubtedly not been done.
A combined reading of the two statutes would imply that, even though the Tenancy Act proceedings may be generally subject to the Limitation Act, the restricted proviso under Section 7 of the Tenancy Act, which establishes a time frame beyond which no extension may be granted, must apply. It is necessary to deal with the legal actions brought about by unpaid rent in this way as a tenant cannot use the space and then fail to make rent payments. This remains true even in the event of a disagreement about rent. As a result, in situations where there is agreement over the agreed-upon rent amount and even in cases where there is disagreement, the renter is obliged to deposit all arrears of rent. The necessary actions must be completed within the allotted period and should truly be submitted with the application submitted in accordance with Sub-Sections (1) and (2) of Section 7 of the Tenancy Act. The proviso only permits a one-time extension, that to maximum of two-months only.
The respondent cannot be helped by the simple accusation that there was improper legal advice since, if this argument were to be adopted, a tenant would have full permission to occupy a space without paying rent and then argue that he was not given the right counsel. The tenant must face the legal repercussions of failing to take the necessary actions if they hire an advocate and follow his instructions.
It was quickly determined that the HC’s order could not stand on its own, and as a result, it was set aside, thereby sustaining the Trial Court’s ruling. The appeal was therefore allowed, and all the costs (nearly Rs. 78000) were held to be paid to the appellant.
ANALYSIS
From the facts and the contentions of the parties, it could be inferred that the Hon’ble Courts differed in their interpretations of the term “sufficient cause”. Section 5 of the Limitation Act states that-
Extension of prescribed period in certain cases– Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.[4]
The sufficient cause to be decided here was the- absence of proper legal guidance by the legal counsel of the respondent. The case of Mariambai & Anr. v. Hamifbai & Anr[5]. (hereinafter Mariambai case) threw some light on the issue. The case delved into the issue and concluded that absence of proper legal advice is a mistake of law which cannot be taken as a reason for condonation of delay. But the reason could be sufficient where the provisions are ambiguous and the mistake committed was bona-fide. If the provisions are simple and plain the mistake won’t be excusable.[6] The principle of exercise of reasonable care evolved from the cases. It became an established principle that mistake of law could be excused had the mistake been done when the counsel took reasonable care. But, in cases where reasonable care was not taken and mistake done bona-fide, the Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 couldn’t be read with Section 5 and therefore condonation of delay would be rejected as the reason wouldn’t qualify to be one sufficient in nature. Being a professional, an advocate is supposed to be equipped with the nuances and intricacies of the provisions in question which could only be excused when the provision itself is abrupt or ambiguous.
Here the question was about the payment of the rents. The Tenant Respondent failed to pay the rents to the Landlord. The SC opined that since the disagreement over the rent does not matter, the rents must be duly paid on time and in case of non-payment, the landlord has the right to ask the tenant to vacate his premises. The condonation of delay does not empower the tenant to escape the liability of paying the rents. Thus, the judgement went in the favour of the appellant.[7]
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the case of Debashish Paul v. Amal Boral, establishes a link between the Section 5 of the Limitations Act, 1963 and other provisions of the Statutes. The case though simple in facts, does explore the basic and fundamental concepts of the Limitation Act and thereby becomes one of the major authorities for the subsequent cases falling under this domain. The case not only brings clarity on points of limitation but also reiterates the position and rights of the tenants and the landlords. The landlords though having the possession of the property cannot impose his authority over the landlord, who is the ultimate owner of the property. Condonation of delay could not be any reason to stop the party from paying taxes. Thus, the case serves as an important precedent for the upcoming litigations in these aspects.
This analysis is written by Kush Shanker from Maharashtra National Law University Aurangabad, an intern under legal vidhiya
[1] West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, No. 38, Acts of West Bengal State Legislature, 1997 (India)
[2] The Limitation Act, 1963, No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 1963 (India)
[3] Bijay Kumar Singh v. Amit Kumar Chamariya, (2019) 10 SCC 660
[4] The Limitation Act, 1963, § 5, No. 36, Acts of Parliament, 1963 (India)
[5] Mariambai and Anr. v. Hamifbai and Anr., AIR 1967 MP 107
[6] Ator Ali v. Abdul Majid, AIR 1941 Cal 716
[7] Vishal Hablani, Counsel’s Mistake as “Sufficient Cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act- A Critical Analysis, The RMNLU Law Review Blog (Nov. 4, 2023, 4:47 PM), https://rmlnlulawreview.com
