| CITATION | SC 2022 (3) 150 |
| DATE OF JUDGEMENT | 23rd March, 2022 |
| COURT | Supreme Court of India |
| APPELLANT | Bharati Bhattacharjee |
| RESPONDENT | Quazi Md. MAKSUDUZZAMAN |
| BENCH | Dinesh Maheshwari |
INTRODUCTION
This case throws light upon a consumer dispute between two people. Section 2(e) “consumer dispute” means a dispute where the person against whom a complaint has been made, denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint. The question of specific performance is delved into where it is held that is a person received even a part of any sale consideration and is unable to fulfil his duties the period of limitation would have begun if the complainants had filed a suit for specific performance.
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Complainant had made multiple requests to the Opposite Party, requesting that she fulfil her duties and obligations as outlined in the aforementioned Agreement. However, the Opposite Parties consistently assured him that the flat would be completed soon, and the Deed of Conveyance for the said flat was never executed in his favour. Additionally, the Complainant had sent a Registered Letter with A/D dated November 9, 2012, requesting that the Opposite Party execute the Deed of Conveyance in their favour. If the complainants had filed a suit for specific performance of the contract, the statute of limitations would have only started when the notice dated 09.11.2012 expired, providing them with notice that the performance was being refused. This is because the appellant in the matters pertaining to the sale of immovable property had received a significant portion of the sale consideration and had neglected to fulfil her duties and obligations, even for the relief of specific performance. In the case of the consumer dispute, it can be safely concluded that the cause of action only became relevant for the purposes of the complaint after the notice period dated 09.11.2012 expired, as the appellant neglected to execute the Deed of Conveyance despite receiving notice from the complainant. In light of this, the complaints as of March 21, 2013, had been well within the bounds of the law.
ISSUES RAISED
- Whether the time taken to register the deed of conveyance be justified?
- What is the consumer dispute revolving around this case?
CONTENTIONS OF APPELLANT
- The appellant requested a review of the order that the National Commission had passed; however, the review applications were denied by the order dated 27-9-2018 2018 SCC Online NCDRC 1914 on the grounds that they lacked substance and that the order in question did not reveal any errors that were readily apparent from the record.
- Citing Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (“the 1986 Act”), the appellant’s learned senior counsel has argued that the complaint could only have been filed within two years of the date the cause of action accrued.
- Referring to the terms of the agreement, the appellant’s learned counsel would contend that the deed of conveyance was required by Clause 3 to be registered within ninety days of the agreement’s execution date. The complaint filed on 21-3-2013 was obviously barred by limitation, according to the learned counsel, because the deed of conveyance could have been filed within two years starting from the end of those 90 days, or from 21-11-2010, had it not been executed within 90 days of the agreement date, or within 90 days from 21-6-2010.
- Even if it wasn’t brought up before the three fora, the limitation issue is fundamental to the issue and merits discussion. The learned counsel would further contend that the relief requested in the complaint essentially amounted to the specific performance of a sale agreement; therefore, in order to obtain such a relief, the complainant would have to allege and demonstrate that he was consistently prepared and willing to fulfil his obligations under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
CONTENTIONS OF RESPONDENT
- The National Commission’s 2018 SCC Online NCDRC 1212 judgement and order have been duly supported by the contesting respondents’ (complainants’) learned counsel. The counsel further argues that the National Commission has correctly rejected the suggestions regarding the existence of two agreements in each of these cases, and that they are completely unfounded. The complaint’s allegation that notice was served on September 11, 2012, to execute the deed of conveyance has also been cited by the learned counsel.
- According to the counsel, the complaint’s cause of action arose from the fact that the deed was not executed despite notice, and as a result, the complaints in question could not have been deemed barred by limitation.
- Furthermore, the learned counsel would argue that since the complainants’ respondents had not withheld any evidence that was within their control or possession, there would be no need to draw any unfavourable conclusions in this case. The complaint’s response to a vague question in the interrogatories cannot be used to draw unfavourable conclusions about the complainant, according to the learned counsel, since the National Commission and the District Forum have both rejected the idea that there are two agreements.
JUDGEMENT
It is necessary to reject these appeals. However, we have noted that the appellant received temporary relief when these appeals were heard on August 26, 2019, and September 23, 2019. This has only caused a delay in the respondents’ preferred party’s Deed of Conveyance’s execution. Expenses should be borne by the appellant for this needless litigation and delay.
Consequently, these appeals are rejected along with costs of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) for each.
There is also no substance to the other alternative submission, which calls for allowing interest to begin 90 days after the agreement date. Contrary to this suggestion, even the interest allowed by the National Commission seems excessive when we consider that the appellant received a significant portion of the sale consideration in both cases, but she has not yet executed the necessary deed or fulfilled other contractual obligations. Having said that, we would end the matter there as the complainants have not contested the portion of the National Commission’s order that permits the appellant to receive interest at the rate of 10% annually from the date of filing of complaint.
Additionally, all pending applications have been resolved.
ANALYSIS
Despite the fact that two documents with the same date are displayed, they don’t seem to be separate agreements for various properties, for different areas of the same property, or for dividing the entire sale consideration. The only way to interpret them would be as copies or drafts of each other. In any case, it would be absurd to assume that the consideration amount stated in the two purportedly contemporaneous documents would be added up to determine the sale consideration. It appears that the State Commission viewed the case from an entirely incorrect perspective and broke the law by acknowledging the appellant’s irrational claims. We are therefore confident that the National Commission correctly rejected the directives issued by the State Commission. After applying the principles with the appropriate modifications to the subject matter under consideration, we must understand the term “consumer dispute” in terms of the definition given by Section 2(e) of the 1986 Act in the case of the dispute pertaining to the agreement for sale, where the appellant is acting in the capacity of a seller against the complainants, who are acting in the capacity of consumers. If the complainants were to file a suit for specific performance of contract, the statute of limitations would have only started from the period of expiry of notice dated 9-11-2012, when they would have had the notice that the performance was being refused, in the matters relating to the sale of immovable property where the appellant had received a substantial part of the sale consideration and had failed to perform her duties and obligations, even for the relief of specific performance. In any case, with regard to the consumer dispute, it could be assumed that the cause of action only became relevant for the purposes of the complaint after the appellant neglected to execute the deed of conveyance despite receiving notice from the complainant.
So, the complaints that were submitted on March 21, 2013, were well within the allotted time.
CONCLUSION
As we know, “2(e) “consumer dispute” refers to a situation in which the subject of a complaint either refutes or denies the accusations made in the complaint.”
Regarding further claims regarding the complainants’ proof of readiness and willingness to carry out the contract’s portion, the parties’ averments and the entirety of the case’s facts and circumstances make it clear that the complainants were not required to perform any material tasks. Instead, the appellant’s failure to fulfil the burden constituted the essential component of performance. If the complainants had filed a suit for specific performance of the contract, the statute of limitations would have only started when the notice dated 09.11.2012 expired, providing them with notice that the performance was being refused. This is because the appellant in the matters pertaining to the sale of immovable property had received a significant portion of the sale consideration and had neglected to fulfil her duties and obligations, even for the relief of specific performance. In any case, with regard to the consumer dispute, it can be safely assumed that the cause of action only became relevant for the purposes of the complaint after the notice period dated 09.11.2012 expired, as the appellant neglected to execute the Deed of Conveyance despite receiving notice from the complainant. In light of this, the complaints as of March 21, 2013, had been well within the bounds of the law.
REFERENCES
- https://indiankanoon.org/doc/162184425/
- https://www.the-laws.com/Encyclopedia/browse/Case?CaseId=002202868000\
This article is written by Druti Dutta of Symbiosis Law School, Noida; Intern of Legal Vidhiya.
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