Amraj Singh And Ors. vs Shambhu Singh And Ors (1932) All 632, 140 Ind Cas 509
| Citation | (1932) 7 AIR 1932 All 632, 140 Ind Cas 509 |
| Date of Judgment | 8TH July 1932 |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Case Type | Civil Appeal No, 90 of 1932 |
| Appellant | Amraj Singh and ors. |
| Respondent | Shambhu Singh and ors |
| Bench | Chief Justice Sulaiman |
| Referred | Hindu Succession Act 1956 |
FACTS OF THE CASE
Tulshi Prasad Singh and Deonath Singh, two brothers, filed Suit No. 140 of 1917, a pre-emption lawsuit, against Tilakdhari Singh and others. The lawsuit was decided subject to the vendees receiving Rs. 3,000 as the purchase money. The brothers only had Rs. 1,000, so they borrowed the remaining Rs. 2,000 from some of the plaintiffs and the forefathers of other plaintiffs in the lawsuit that gave rise to this appeal by mortgaging their ancestors’ land. After Tulshi Prasad Singh passed away, the current lawsuit was filed against him, his sons, and Deonath Singh in an effort to recoup the money through the sale of the property that was hypothecated.
Defendants 1 to 3 are Tulshi Prasad Singh’s minor kids. They argue that the claim must be dismissed because their father or their uncle were not permitted by Hindu law to mortgage the joint family property in order to pay the price of a pre-empted property.
ISSUES
- Whether the minor and their uncle are entitled to permit in the joint family property?
- Whether the acquisition of the property by the right of pre-emption was necessary for the family or even that it was for the benefit of the family and the family estate ?
ARGUMENTS
The learned Subordinate Judge who heard the case concurred with this argument and dismissed the case as it related to the enforcement of the mortgage; nonetheless, he issued a simple money judgement against Deonath Singh based on the personal covenant stated in the mortgage bond. Deonath Singh hasn’t filed an appeal. The plaintiffs argue that the mortgage was reasonable and advantageous and should be upheld in their appeal. Another argument was made that the sons could not keep the benefit they obtained with the plaintiffs’ money and refuse to pay the same amount of money at the same time.
The property gained through pre-emption appears to have been forfeited to the family as a result of a lawsuit filed by a minor member of the vendors’ family, according to Deonath Singh’s written declaration, and there is no proof to the contrary. The appeal was heard by two learned judges of this court, who referred the entire matter to a larger Bench due to the conflicting rulings on the issue of a Hindu family manager’s ability to raise funds using the security of joint family property for the purchase of new property. The rulings in Kishen Sahai v. Raghunath Singh A.I.R. 1929 All. 139 and Inspector Singh v. Kharak Singh A.I.R. 1928 All. 403 reflect the position I have taken on the manager’s authority to solicit money in the circumstances mentioned above. I believe it is necessary for me to discuss the complete law on the topic as the matter has been referred to a larger Bench in order to be resolved.
The norm says that family property cannot be sold by the father without the approval of his sons since it is intended to sustain those who are already alive, those who are conceived, and those who have not yet been born. The same criterion is applicable if the boss is an uncle rather than, say, a father. Because they have an interest in the property, he needs the approval of all family members in order to transfer it. Given the current condition of the legislation, it can be to the family’s detriment if some of the members are minors and urgent funds need to be raised.
This statute was established as an obligation between a minor and his manager and makes no mention of the circumstances of the combined Hindu family, which includes some minor family members. However, this exact text has occasionally been cited as equally applying to the situation of a mixed family. This legal definition has led to the understanding that the manager of a Hindu family with young children may only charge the estate in the event of an absolute necessity.
In Sanyasi Charan v. Krishnadhan Banerji A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 237 their Lordships of the Privy Council refused to hold that a minor member of a family was bound by the liabilities that arose out of a business started by the adult member of the family, although he was the manager of it
JUDGEMENT
If it had been identified in the present instance that the pre-emption of the new property was for the estate’s benefit and was a prudent owner would have done in order to benefit the estate, then we should have had the opportunity to consider some additional crucial questions For instance, whether Brij Narain’s case A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 50 impliedly overruled or dissented from the rule established in Hanooman Pershad Panday’s case [1854-57] 6 M.I.A. 393 that a manager can charge the estate for the benefit of the estate (as well as “in case of need”) or “whether the expression “for the benefit of the estate” should be given a very restricted meaning.
But in this case, the trial court determined that the transaction was not in the estate’s best interests, and all of the judges on this bench agreed with that conclusion. We also concur that the loan was not made for a legitimate need or to pay off an earlier debt. Considering these results, I believe the appeal is over.
Upon the crucial facts, the two situations can be easily distinguished from one another. In the latter instance, it was not even contended that the loan was obtained prudently or for the estate’s benefit because it was taken to launch a new business. In the Pull Bench case, despite the fact that the loan was accepted for an entirely different objective, it was determined that the transaction was wise and advantageous. Further appeal ought to be rejected.
REFERENCES
This Case analysis is written by Aditi Shakya of Institute of Law, Jiwaji University Gwalior , Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
