ADALAT PRASAD V/S ROOPLAL JINDAL AND ORS (2004) 7 SCC 338
| Citation | (1932) AC 562. |
| Date of Judgment | 26TH May 1932. |
| Court | House of lord |
| Case Type | Scots declit law and English Tort law |
| Appellant | Donoghue’s |
| Respondent | Stevenson |
| Bench | Lord Buck masterLord AtkenLord TomlinLord Thanker tonLord Macmillan |
| Referred | Sections refered to the ; Neighbor Principle in Tort Laws |
FACTS OF THE CASE
On August 26, 1928, Mrs. Donoghue’s (Plaintiff) friend bought her a ginger beer. She consumed about half of the bottle, which was made of dark opaque glass when the remainder of the contents was poured into a tumbler. At this point, the decomposed remains of a snail floated out causing her alleged shock and severe gastroenteritis .Mrs. Donoghue was not able to claim through breach of warranty of a contract as she was not a party to any contract. Therefore, she issued proceedings against Stevenson, the manufacturer (Defendant) which snaked its way up to the House of Lords. After consuming almost half of the contents of the bottle, when the rest of the ginger beer was poured into a tumbler, dead, decomposed remains of a snail floated into it. The nauseating sight coupled with the consequences of ingesting the impurities in the bottle caused shock and severe gastro-enteritis to the appellant. The case was first filed in the Second Division of Sessions Court of Scotland where an interlocutor was issued by Lord Ordinary for proof after a good cause of action of the petitioner was found. But subsequently, another interlocutor by the majority was issued recalling the previous interlocutor and the action was dismissed. An appeal was then filed in the House of Lords.
ISSUES
Does a manufacturer of ginger beer bottles owe a duty of care to the end consumer while he did not directly sell it to him, but only via a distributor?
ARGUMENTS
The ginger beer bottle was manufactured and sold to the public for consumption by the respondent- the bottle bore labels of the respondent’s company, and it was by the respondent who used metal caps to seal them.
The respondent, as manufacturers should have ensured that- A system was in place to ensure snails would not get into their packaged products. An efficient system of inspection was there to conduct checks before the bottles were sealed.
According to the appellants, the respondents failed in both these duties and caused this accident. Since the respondent invited the public (including the appellant) to consume a product they manufactured, bottled, labeled, and sealed and offered no opportunity to the consumer to examine their contents, they owed a duty of care to the appellant to ensure nothing in the bottle would injure such a consumer.
Moreover, the appellants contended that the principle of “the thing speaks for itself.” was applicable in the present scenario. The fact that there was a snail in the bottle ‘spoke for itself’ the negligence of the manufacturers.
Finally, the appellants said that the exceptions to the general principle mentioned above were too strict and limited. (This arguments were presented by appealed)
The respondents claimed that the allegations of injury to the appellant were exaggerated and not as a cause of the alleged snail but due to existing health problems. Hence, the allegations were irrelevant and insufficient to constitute a proper ground for a summons.(This arguments was presented by the respondents)
JUDGEMENT
Donoghue argued that Stevenson owed a duty of care to his customers who were to consume his ginger beer, to have an effective system to clean his bottle and keep it away from snails. Stevenson denied having snails in any of his bottles, arguing that Donoghue’s health problems had been caused by her own bad health conditions. He stated that the facts were not proved, he did not cause Donoghue any harm, and that the damages claimed were excessive.
The matter was first heard in the Outer House of the Court of Sessions before Lord Moncrieff. Here, the owner of the café was added as a defendant but later dropped him because of his lack of contractual relationship with Donoghue, as the ginger beer was purchased by her friend and the fact that the owner of the cafe could not have possibly examined the content of the bottle.
Lord Moncrieff, dismissed the argument and case law that required that there must be a contractual relationship between the parties before liability can be incurred for negligence in preparing goods for consumption. He described the principle as narrow.
Stevenson appealed to the Inner House of the Court of Sessions which was presided over by four judges who had heard the case of Mullen v AG Barr & Co Ltd where it was held that no duty of care could arise in the absence of a contractual relationship. Thus, the appeal was allowed by the majority of the judges while Lord Hunter dissented again.
Donoghue appealed to the House of Lords. The judges who heard her appeal were Lord Atkin, Lord Thanker ton, Lord Tomlin, Lord Buck master, and Lord MacMillan. Donoghue’s Counsel argued that Stevenson owed a duty of care that was independent of contract because the bottles in which the ginger beers come in could not be examined and also because it was meant for human consumption.
Stevenson’s Counsel argued that it was an established law in England and Scotland that no duty was owed by manufacturers to anybody with whom they had no direct contract. They argued that the exceptions which were created in English and Scottish laws were not present in this case; that is, that the ginger beer was not intrinsically dangerous and that the defendant, Stevenson, was not aware that the product was dangerous.
The House of Lords held in favor of Donoghue, albeit, not unanimously.
According to Lord Atkin, the case was an important one because of the bearing the decision on it would have on public health. To him, the moral rule that requires one to love their neighbor, or in-law, manifests as the rule that one has to take care not to injure his neighbor. He says that care must be taken, and such care must be reasonable, in order not to put one’s neighbor in danger or cause one’s neighbor an injury that is foreseeable. He defined a neighbor as one who will be directly affected by one’s action or omission so much so that one has to put such a person in his contemplation while he does such action or makes such omission.
REFERENCES
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donoghue_v_Stevenson#Legal_background
This Article is written by Bhumika H Brahmbhatt of JG Institute of Law, Intern at Legal Vidhiya.
