ABDUL KHADER V. LAND TRIBUNAL, SEDAM AND ANOTHER
| Citation | AIR 1987 KARNATAKA 18 :: ILR 1986 KANT 1446 |
| Date of Judgment | 03/04/1986 |
| Court | High Court of Karnataka |
| Case Type | Writ Appeal No. 2661 of 1985 |
| Appellant | Abdul Khader |
| Respondent | LAND TRIBUNAL, SEDAM AND ANOTHER |
| Amicus Curiae | M.R. Janaradhana, Shivaraj Patil, T.S. Ramchandra |
| Bench | K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, N. D. VENKATESH , JJ. |
| Referred Acts | Karnataka Land Reforms Act (10 of 1962) |
| Referred Cased | Nagappa Channappa v. State of KarnatakaRevanna Siddappa Hadri v. Asstt. Commr. IndiNagappa’s caseBhikoba Shankar v. Mohan Lal Punchand,Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of MaharashtraThe State of Maharashtra v. Annapurna BaiMohammed Ibrahim v. Mohammad AbubakkerState of Maharashtra v. VyasendraBegullabapi Raju v. State of Andhra PradeshRamondarsingh v. State of Madhya PradeshVengdasalam Pillai v. Union Territory of PondicherryGajanan v. Seth BrindabanRaj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari |
Keywords
Abdul Khader, 03 April 1986, interpretation of land laws, Writ Appeal No. 2661 of 1985
Introduction
The present case is an appeal against the order dated 31/10/1985 of the single judge of the Karnataka High Court in writ petition no. 10090 of 1984, filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of The Indian Constitution, challenging an order dated 21/5/1984 of the Land Tribunal, Sedam, Gulbarga Dist. of Karnataka, declaring him as a surplus landholder under the Karnataka land reforms Act, 1961 and ordering him to surrender the surplus land of 32 acres, 37 guntas.
Facts of the case
The petitioner/appellant, Abdul Khader, as per his declaration under s. 66 of the Act, holds a total of 140 acres, 37 guntas. The said land was the property of the joint family. The Joint family was constituting of Abdul Khader, his wife, two major sons and four unmarried daughters.
In the year of 1961, the Karnataka Land Reforms Act(hereinafter the Act), was enacted by the legislature of the state of Karnataka. As per the provisions of the Act, no family or a person not being a member of the family shall hold a land in excess of the ceiling limit specified. The ceiling was declared as 10 units.
Legal background of the case
The Land Tribunal after an enquiry on the declaration of Abdul Khader concluded that the petitioner and his family members as stated constitute a joint family. It also found that one of the sons was a major and accordingly the tribunal allowed the joint family to hold two ceilings. As a result, it directed the petitioner to retain 108 acres and surrender the rest of 32 acres, 37 guntas as per the provisions of the Act. Against this order of the tribunal the petitioner had preferred an appeal before the Karnataka High Court. The same was listed before a single judge bench.
The learned single judge allowing the appeal partly, held that in view of the recent judgements of the Supreme Court the judgements of the Karnataka High Court in Nagappa Channappa v. State of Karnataka and Revanna Siddappa Hadri v. Assistant Commissioner, India are not a source of good law anymore. Further, he allowed the petitioner to hold 20 more acres and ordered to surrender 12 acres, 21 guntas(To avoid repetition and better clarity the contentions and conclusions before and by the single judge will be dealt with at another appropriate stage).
Contentions of the petitioner
- The Land Tribunal was wrong in holding his second son as a minor on the appointed day of the Act.
- Even otherwise i.e. he was a minor on the appointed day of the Act, given the judgement of the division bench of the Karnataka High Court, the age on the date of the judgement has to be considered.
- Resultantly his family was entitled to have three ceilings rather than two.
Issues
There were two issues for the determination before the Division Bench in this case. They are:
- With reference to what date the extent of the holding of the declarant (the person or the family as the case may be) has to be determined by the Tribunal?
- Whether a minor who is not a declarant himself can request the tribunal to permit him to retain a ceiling area for himself?
The second issue was not connected to the issue in hand. But the division bench has observed that the single judge while deciding the case has also dealt with the above issue and also, the issue is of general importance. Since the single judge eventually touched the matter, it is relevant to decide the issue too.
Judgement of the learned single judge
On the first contention, the single judge was of the view that the appointed day of the Act is relevant rather than the date of judgement. The judge denied the authority derived from Nagappa’s case in view of the Supreme Court’s judgments in Bhikoba Shankar v. Mohan Lal Punchand, Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, and The State of Maharashtra v. Annapurna Bai.
On the second issue, the single judge was of the view that a minor cannot request the tribunal to permit him to retain a ceiling area. He was of the view that S. 63(4) does not confer any rights on him at all. The judge in that behalf , placing reliance on State of Maharashtra v. Vyasendra, Begullabapi Raju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Ramondarsingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Pillai v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, held that in view of the above judgements of the Apex court, the decision of the division bench in Revanna siddppa’s case was outdated.
Cases discussed
Before getting into the judgement of the division Bench it would be convenient to go through the ratios of the judgements mentioned above, issue wise.
On the first issue
In Nagappa’s case in 1979, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had held that the ceiling area of a family has to be determined on the date of the final decision of the Tribunal.
In Bhikoba’s case, the Supreme Court has held that the Act has to be construed in accordance with the scheme and object.
In Raghunath Laxman Wani’s case, where the Supreme Court was considering the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, held that the policy of the Act was from the appointed day itself. The Act allows no person to hold land in excess from the appointed day of the Act itself.
Similar were the observations of the Supreme Court in Annapurna Bai’s case.
Decision on issue no.1
The Division Bench was in complete agreement with the view of the single judge in holding the law in Nagappa’s case as no longer valid. The court further observed that the law in the present case is not different from that of the Acts considered by the Supreme Court in the cases discussed above. The intention of the Act was to apply the Act from the appointed day itself and not on the date of the final order of the Tribunal. In considering the object of the Act also it is the permissible view.
Hence the reference must be to the appointed day and not to the date of final order of the Tribunal while determining the ceiling area. Issue no.1 was answered accordingly.
Cases on the second issue
In Vyasendra’s case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961. The issue, in this case, was that whether a land held by a woman as stridhana or separate property should be included in land held by the ‘Family Unit’ or not. The Supreme Court highlighted the phrase “whether jointly or separately” used in sub section (1) of S. 4 of the Act and held that in view of the deeming clause, the property held by women had to be treated as property of ‘Family Unit’.
In Bapu Raju’s case, the Supreme court was dealing with the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. The issue here was whether land which is separately in the name of a minor can be treated as family property for the purpose of the above Act or not. The Supreme Court was of the view that a minor had no right to claim a separate ceiling area and the property had to be considered as a part of family property for the purpose of the Act.
In Ramondrasingh’s case, the Supreme Court was dealing with Madhya Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act. Relying on the above case, the Supreme Court held that minors had no right to claim a separate ceiling area.
In Vengdasalam Pillai’s case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation on Ceiling on Land) Act. The issue in this case was whether land held by wife and children partitioned before the appointed day of the Act be included in finding the total family property or not. The Supreme Court answered the issue in affirmative in view of sub section (4) of S. 4 of the Act, where it was specifically mentioned that “in calculating the extent of land held by any person, any land which was transferred by sale, gift or otherwise or partitioned by that person after the appointed day but before the commencement of this Act, shall be taken into account as if such land had not been transferred or partitioned as the case may be”.
In Revanna’s case, while construing certain provisions of the Karnataka Act, the learned single judge held that the land transferred by way of partition was not included in the deemed transfer of land under S. 63(10). Further held that the authority has to take into account the partition while determining the ceiling.
Judgement on issue no.2
The Division Bench outrightly rejected the applicability of any of the above Supreme Court’s judgements in the present case. The court held that in Vyasendra case and Vengdasalam Pillai’s case, there were deeming provisions in the relevant Acts. Unlike the above two, there is no such deeming clause in the present Act. Also in the remaining two cases, there were certain provisions in the relevant Acts, to cause the Supreme Court to deliver such judgements. But no such similar provisions are there in the present case.
Further, the court was of the view that the relation of humans with land is special. Unlike other matters these are ancient. The relations are not uniform. They differ based on geographical, political and economical factors. The court also took note of the fact that land laws differ from state to state in the ceiling, compensation for land taken away etc. Given the unique nature, land laws unless found the same must not be interpreted in a similar way blindly. Regard has to be given to the specific circumstances of the case.
Further the Division Bench observed that the Revanna’s case was decided in the year of 1977 itself. Many of the acts would have been performed by the residents of the state based on the decision. Many transactions of lands would get affected with the interference in the above judgement. The bench also cited certain cases on its behalf. In the case of Gajanan v. Seth Brindaban, the Supreme Court has observed that “people in arranging their affairs are entitled to rely on the decisions of the higher courts”. Any decision of the court that has prevailed for a considerable amount of time should not be altered unless there are exceptional cases to do so. Because it disturbs the complex matrix that was woven out of such a decision. Also, it leads to the removal of clarity and introduction of ambiguity into law. The Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain Pandey v. Sant Prasad Tewari, held that the doctrine of stare decisis(to stand by things decided) has to be adhered to unless otherwise necessary due to exceptional facts.
For the above reasons, the Division Bench was of the view that the law out of the Revanna’s case is a valid law.
Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed. The Division Bench agreed with the single judge on issue 1 and differed on issue 2. The matter was remitted back to decide it, on the findings of the present case.
Conclusion
The case is related to land reforms in the state of Karnataka. Land law is unique in several aspects. The relation of humans with land is beyond economical. It is often related to customs. The land relations differ from one place to another. A law, even though similar unless there are special reasons to do so, must not be applied without the application of mind to a new place without understanding the peculiar circumstances of such a place. The same was done in this case. The court in its prudence had decided not to equate the Karnatakan law with that of other state’s laws. Further, clarity of the law is very important. Judgements that were given a long ago and have been commanding public obedience must not be altered for trivial reasons. There must be solid reasons to do so. Otherwise, it may lead to ambiguity in law and result in increase in violations and may result in lawlessness in the society.
References
This Case Analysis is done by Avula Veerabhadra Reddy, a second year student of Central University of South Bihar and an intern at legal vidhiya.
